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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : Case No. 14000 
WILL SAVAGE, : 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE 
CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction on a charge of loitering in 
violation of Section 32-1-17 (5) Salt Lake City Ordinances 1965, as 
amended. 
' DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of loitering in Salt Lake City Court, 
the Honorable Judge Paul Grant presiding. The decision was affirmed 
on appeal in the Third District Court of Utah, the Honorable Judge 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. , presiding. A motion for dismissal on 
constitutional grounds was heard but overruled by the Court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction on the constitutional 
grounds that the section of the ordinance under which he was convicted 
is void for vagueness and overbreadth* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the early morning of November 28, 1974, appellant drove 
his vehicle into the parking lot of the Tri-Arc Travel Lodge, 161 West 
2nd South, where he offered to help a police officer who was at that time 
assisting a waitress in starting her car. His assistance not being required, 
appellant drove his vehicle out of the parking lot but returned shortly 
thereafter. The police officer, Mr. Lowder, noted the license number 
of the appellant's car and checked that number with the Utah Bureau of 
Information. The Bureau informed the officer that the vehicle was regis -
tered to one Joe Van. 
Officer Lowder and another officer, Mr. York, noticed the 
same vehicle parked by the southwest corner of the hotel approximately 
fifteen minutes after it had left the parking lot. Officer Lowder stationed 
Officer York near the car and proceeded to the second floor where he 
observed appellant approach a coke machine on that floor and then proceeded 
down a staircase. The officer followed appellant to his car. Appellant 
was asked to step out of the car by the officer. The officer then proceeded 
without asking appellant for identification or an explanation of his presence, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to pat down appellant. The search produced no weapons. Another 
officer, Mr. Boelter, assisted officer Lowder at this time. He 
removed appellant's wig whereupon officer Lowder recognized appellant 
as someone other than Joe Van. Officer Lowder asked appellant what 
he was doing in the hotel to which appellant responded that he stopped 
to get a coke and meet a female acquaintance. Testimony of officer 
York indicated appellant possessed a can of coke when questioned. 
Officer Lowder then placed appellant under arrest for loitering. Appellant 
was found guilty of loitering in the Third District Court of Utah, Judge 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. , presiding. He appeals from that conviction. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented to the Court is whether Section 
32-1-7 (5) Salt Lake City Ordinances 1965, as amended, is void for 
vagueness and overbreadth. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 32-1-7 (5) SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCES 1965, 
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BECATJSTTrT130T^T3rjTT^ 
WAllNING^JXrCTTrZENS~OF A RULE WHICH IS TO BE OBEYED. 
The ordinance under which appellant was convicted provides: 
Section 32-1-17. Loitering. It shall be unlawful for any. 
person to loiter in Salt Lake City. A person is guilty 
of loitering when he: 
(5) Loiters, remains or wanders in or about a 
.building, lot, street, sidewalk, or any other 
public or private place without apparent reason Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and under circumstances which justify suspicion 
that he may be engaged in or about to engage in a 
crime and: 
(a) upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to 
identify himself by name and address; or 
(b) after having given his name and address by 
inquiry of a police officer refuses or fails 
to give a reasonably credible account of his 
conduct and purpose. 
It is a well established principle of due process that a law must 
give fair notice of the offending conduct. To be consistent with the 
requirements of due process a penal ordinance must contain certain 
ascertainable standards of guilt, so that men of reasonable understanding 
are not required to guess at the meaning of the ordinance. Winters vs. 
People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507(1948). 
The United States Supreme Court in Papachristou vs. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972), has stated that a penal law 
is void for vagueness when it Mfails to give a person of ordinary intelli-
gence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. 
United States vs. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 667, 74 S. Ct. 808, 812, 98 L. 
Ed. 989. " See Palmer vs. City of Euclid, 402 U. S. 544 (1971). In 
Papachristou, supra , the Court ruled unconstitutional a Jacksonville 
city ordinance which punished "common night walkers,M persons 
1
 'wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful 
purpose or object" on the grounds that such ordinance did not give 
fair notice of proscribed conduct and encouraged arbitrary and erratic 
ar res t s and convictions. 
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In Shuttleswortli vs. City oOi^nTmgham, 382 1,1, S. .' 17 , <'w 
(1965), the Court stated that if it were to rcau literally the cTy omhumee 
wliich makes it an offense to "so sam.., .-••.= . . • . • . ; • . . i.>>.', ;.ny i^ . iv-:i 
or sidewalk . . . as to obstruct free passage over, ui, or along said street 
or sidewalk" and. further provides that ".a slu.ii mso JK uniawi'ui .'or any 
per:-**.".
 t'o ;^-;;r(J, or A ) . L C L.pw.. ;..,y MivcL or sidewalk of the city after 
having been requested by a police o'^iccr to move or, f t the ordinance would 
be unconsti tutional. Spoakim. .'...-; he .najorie. i-.'thi Cui.r»:, Mr. Justice 
Stewart stated: 
Literally read, therefore, the second part of 
this ordinance says that a person may stand on a 
public sidewalk in Birminham only at the whim 
of any police officer of thai city. The constitutional *"*\' :. ' 
vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration. 
It Tdoes not provide for government by clearly defined 
laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-
moment opinions of a policeman o\\ the beat. T Cox vs. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. o:>o, r/7^, h:. . . MJ. 2d 471, 501 
'' 8lT^7T5tr453. 
In Shuttleswortli Lnc Court nekl LIKK' since the trial comrL may 
have found the defendants giuhy ^y iiteauLy upplying me iineom,iaaLjv,a, i,y 
•bro.ui iiTu.s t>; ;he ordinance, the conviction could not stand. The Court 
noticed, However, uua the ordinance was not necessarily unconstitutional 
i
. ,"i i i:i . v.e ,. I *e s e r e 1 t \ u i r i s i \ i r s l ru.'d " ^ * •''w.i'.i. nee iiui'. 'u
 V1
 f
 • o ^uuiSu 
only those persons wno aid i;ot ooey the request oi zr*c omcer to move 
from the corner "though ^ r e t i r e s „o ^.va. .v-. ; • •,' ,..,a.Jna. h •• 
- 5 -
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envisage situations in which, biich an ordinance might be unconstitutionally 
up] h k U , ."K!
 ( ^ J * t i , ' i *'' . 
^ People vs. i ^ r d L 300 N. LL. 2d 01, the New York Court 
of Appcais dCCJLU rexi i.. ,coi»S. ../uii^jK,. a
 t*>aer, s. n s i . . \ A r ; e I\ iiv.tvM. , t . o a ; s c. = 1 
verbatim to che oruinuncc nuv challenged. Vhe ACW York statute 
provided: 
Section 240, 35. Loitering--A person is guilty of loitering 
when he: 
• (6) Loi ters , remains or wanders in or about a place 
without apparent reason and under suspicion that he 
may be engaged or about to engage in cr ime, and 
upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to identify 
himself or fails to give a reasonably credible account • 
• of his conduct and purposes, 
• The Court stated in Berck, supra, a t 413: 
• The statute in the case before us is not informative 
on its face and utterly fails to give adequate notice 
of the behavior it forbids. The statute contains two 
substantive elements: (1) loitering 'in or about a • 
place without apparent reason,T (2) under circum-
stances which 'justify suspicion' that a person 'may 
be engaged or about to engage in c r ime , ' Certainly, 
. . in light of our decision in People vs. Diaz, 4 N. Y. 
2d 469, 470, 176 N. Y. S. M 3 I 3 , 314, 151 N. E. 2d 871, . ../ 
872, supra--in wliich we held unconstitutionally vague 
an ordinance penalizing lounging or loitering 'about 
a n y . . . street corner . . . Dunkirk' - -the first 
element standing alone could not possible be held to 
give sufficient notice of the conduct proscribed. The 
second element - - that the loitering be done under 
circumstances which justify suspicion that a person 
is engaged in or about to engage in crime is similarly 
obscure. Assuredly, there are no coiivrnonly understood 
set of suspicions circumstances of which all citizens 
are aware and to which applicability of the statute is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 
restricted, in other words, this additional language 
does not condemn any identifiable act or omission 
or res t r ic t the operation of the statute to a particular 
place or a clearly defined set of circumstances but, rather , 
it merely indicates that a person may be held for loitering 
if suspicion of criminality happens to be created in the mind 
of the arrest ing officer. In short, :as we declared in the 
Dia_z case (4 N. Y. 2d, at p. -.7.1, WO N. Y.S. 22 at p. 2i5, 
151 N. 12. 2u <\i. a„ <S/2)., tno statute tails not orny to point 
up the prohibited act, either actual or threatened hut to 
advise the citizen in sufficiently clear and unambiguous 
terms of the distinction between 'conduct calculated to 
harm and thai. whi.cn is essentia\]y innocent. T 
The standards set n.-r.;. ra iVipacnrJ^liX"., s t v r a , Slvatticswori r, 
supra, and Berck, supra, are clear. A penal law must give fair notice 
to men of reasonable intelligence m CU.J^UOL a. ne r.\w,u^., .a wader 
for an ordinance to give sucu notice JLL must clearly articulate the prohibited 
act and. advise persons of conduct proscribed and that which is essentially 
The Salt Lake City ordinance section now challenged makes 
any other pur>i:;.o or private place without apparent reason, " thus making 
com mon n ig i xc -1 x m c s i J.*O i i s n.. * i a w * u a. ». i. CuC a r rcs c j. i i g o i u c e r deems ti a c. "i 
.^v.uuci- ":. . ,.-.clous" and is not satisfaied witn ti.e "rca^onaoiy credible 
account" tendered , . an explanation which b* hrrce^ iu »v given in order 
• :.vOtu i: rresi. ..v.mVierai"'i'i «.v!i*v.,iirl«.,:»iv.rii\,s s m m a r to evening 
constitutionals couk\ no "suspicions loitering" unaer this ordinance; 
window shopping,
 >;oggii,;.,, - , \e;\>, ;; m^v i - . .M^ r x r n i s r v ;,*> a*nctical.ly 
the entire populace. 
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The ordinance in question violates the due process d au.se under 
the 14th Amendment In that the ordinance lacks any standard of 
ascertainable guilt necessary to prevent arbitrary police action. The 
oru»I"M"Ii<vV 11*.*iiw.\-» v"*.*iii~i11it11, -\c iv H .i\i \\ri,i-* . .>\ «• i >.IV/JVJ ^ranaarc^ <iro 
normally iiinoCGnt. i ae iacA oL uejiHitcncsb OJ trie ordinance allows 010 
police net to be cn^; : , • \;\ ry-y \.r.rv :.n •'*--. ;. .*• * <- : \1 r \,v.o .,;.. • v;,.;,n y 
undesirable in the eyes of the police and prw^'cuaon, ahhot.!^; noL 
cna rgen^ie V/ILII vuV)r -,"Wi J'I. iCv n. i* C'UCIJ^O, ; i"^  • .--^ _Vi ,<^'ii r>\ i~>\c t) At;'",(. i*iv?e 
In tills ease is therefore void for lack of sufficient notice of conuuet to 
be avoided. 
POINT 11 " • 
SECTION 324-17 (5) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT 
PLACES UNFETTERED DISCRETION IN TIIE HANDS OF POLICE AND 
p^^yTM^ 
.' The ordinance places virtually unfettered discretion in the hands 
(h tiic police a in. li'n"* * ii"i courages tli\),[^\,rj nu ut^c/i/iana/v; ry < run.V'. n^ it. 
In Papacarisa>a, supra, i7\/, uie hupreme Court pointed out the 
Infirmities of an ordinance waicn punisnos waging or strolling about 
without any lawful puposeM when it stated: 
Those generally implicated by the Imprecise terms 
of the ordinance--poor people, non-conformists, 
dissenters , idlers--may be required to comport 
themselves according to the lifestyle deemed 
•. appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. 
Where, as here , there are no standards governing 
the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, 
the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and 
and discriminatory enforcement of the law. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The ordinance now challenged contains no guidelines governing 
the oote rrrd ra. iou as to whether a person is engaged in suspicious loitering. 
The ordinance leaves to the sole discretion ov the police officer the deter-
n'jjj'im i-•. •' • , '.; c\ •«^M •.; UP ; • - ••I-I^ICIUI!'- (*'.iA1 )*i«".',. I'^iri/rou'iciit ot tiic o r -
dinance depends entirely upon WuCuicr the arresting officer is satisfied, 
witii 11 iC rcasouao»y crem* J.c uu.vum /»vvt. I*.• i . > • A • v • . •" .* w ;. ~: 
was the case in IVopie vs. Soeck, ;mpra. Ccrt-aimy WIKIL one person 
considers "suspicious Loitering" may be considered totally innocent by 
another, S;;,,;hi."ir,
 Li±e ±nascertainable standard as to what constitutes 
a "reasonably creuibie account'1 of one's conduct may be construed in 
r .nurac ra r. = c var.aacc r»v umcivrn pii.M. *, Ojiiccrs. 
Thus, tr.e united Scales Supreme Coart in Papachristou, supra, 
and Shuttles wor;;,, su^i'.., arn, ;... *- •• v'wrr > •• .\ w. \p.>ra^ hi ;CL\.V, ^upr.-
stated that the requirement that an offender "give a satisfactory account" 
of his conduct is not Sunicjcn'Liy certain to satisfy due process rocai.v./.efits 
sh.* • - .a- .....y JJC satisfactory to one officer may be unsatisfactory to 
anotner, and even the word "satisfactory" is not susceptible to any standard 
O ^ ' X c i C i u C S ^ , *»,* . * v.*. i- . . ^ H ^ . I 1 M * .^ Li i i •«~ • w T . . - .^-1 i . :-> i <• d , U i i , 2 o ;v„ i
 J# i\. 3d 
841. 
522, 525, L i le S up rem VJ L-* ou r t o i L t \i \ ^  s L <I re e ; c n a IU a n o r ^  i n a a c e \v 11 a c i \ ma o e it 
unlawful for any person "wandering or loitering abroad, or abroad urn.er 
other susp;cinus circumstances at niglit, io ,'iui to give satisfactory account 
s^-p u-Jw o a 1 -f T 11^^ ry Aoi-*nn r.H r^f a r\r\\in<=> n f f i P p r M f n h o i i n r n 11R1 if] 11 10UH1 a S VIOla . t iVe 
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of due process as imposing sanctions upon conduct that may not manifest 
unitiwin; jx.r^ MK-M". Yio1 A\ r ,iiM.k\' s i^^tl : 
As we interpret the cases dealing with loitering 
ordinances, the right of law enforcement officers 
to inquire of persons wandering abroad at night 
is limited to those persons whose conduct gives 
the officer reason for alarm that they are engaged 
in unlawful activity. The cr ime, however, cannot 
be the failure to give answers satisfactorily ;o rhe 
officer. 
If the ordinance means that the legality of a 
person's actions depends upon the opinion of a 
policeman, it would be unconstitutional. City of 
Portland vs. Goodwin, 187 Or. 509, 426, 210 P. 
2d 577 (1949)7 
Thus, whether a per.so.i ,^ ,Kiuh\! w,7 ,;w/(i., w „s i.i^A^u 1;.' • 
freedom depends entirely upon \ ;-.e warn; OL cue officer in determining 
what is suspicious loitering and what constitutes a "reasonably credible 
i >vwu.i/' u,' .. ^i.spoc."1 - r. .,.lt..c: or purpose. 
hi ruiing unconstitutional subsections (3) and (6) of Section 17-2-16 
Salt 1 ,a i\C *',•'/ O \,;:",; * *r. .\ \s w •••>'* c \\ ">r..>\M;o-» par. i.s a. .~.i.vi .v*r ' i'-vr-r--" p^-i'Suri 
w ho r Oci m s a i o u t 'i rot \ * p i a c e i o p ^ ; ce w i tI; ou L a uy i a w i u i nus ine s s o." 
every persr-i. Vv,.o v.anucrs u.c SJW-L UL mo. ••.* .•;.u;-u.«. L i.on,*.-- o tr.e a"j;;Y.L*, 
without any visible or lawful business, the court in Decker vs. Fi l l is , 
306 F. Supp. 613 (1969) stated: 
• • • The provisions . . . would penalize economic condition 
of status, render mere lawful presence on the street or 
in other public places in the absence of 'business' there 
a cr ime, and certainly chill the liberty of lawful move-
ment, presence andphysical status by such an overbreadth 
of prohibition as to literally cover almost any person loit-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the nighttime. The differentiation among those to be 
prosecuted or not prosecuted is left entirely to the police 
without reasonable guidelines between lawful or unlawful status 
or conducL They violate substantive due process under the 
14th Amendment. Goldman vs. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 
908 (D. Colo. 1969); Hughes vs. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 
(E. D. Pa, 1968); Terr i tory of Hawaii vs. Anduhe, 48 F. 
2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931); Smith vs. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 
(E. D. No. Car. 1968). See Powell vs. Texas, 392 U. S. 
514, 88 S. Ct. 2145, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1254 (1968); Robinson 
vs. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 
758 (1962). 
Because the challenged section of the ordinance encourages an 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law due to a lack of any 
ascertainable standards governing a r res t and conviction under the 
ordinance, the ordinance renders fair even-handed administration 
of justice a virtual impossibility. It should therefore be declared 
unconstitutional, 
POINT III 
SECTION 5 OF THE ORDINANCE UNDERCUTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENT THAT ARRESTS ARE LAWFUL ONLY UPON A SHOWING OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Under Section 5 a person may be arrested on suspicion only. 
Probable cause as a means by which some standards of enforcement may 
be employed to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory a r r e s t s are dispensed 
with by the ordinance. As the Supreme Court stated in Papachristou, 
405 U.S. , at 169: 
We allow our police to make a r res t s only on 'probable 
cause,T a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard 
applicable to the States as well as to the Federal Govern-
ment. Arresting a person on mere suspicion, like 
arresting a person for investigation, is foreign to our Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'suspicious' persons would not pass constitutional muster. 
A vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak for a 
conviction which could not be obtained on the real but 
undisclosed grounds for the ar res t . 
Similarly, the court found in Berck, supra, at 415, that the lack 
of probable cause was equally inherent in the ordinance section under 
its consideration. That ordinance section was practically identical 
verbatim with the one now challenged and was declared unconstitutional. 
The courts in both the Berck, supra p. 415, and Drew, supra p. 526, 
noted rejection by the American Law Institute of a loitering provision 
(Model Penal Code Section 250.12 [Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961]) very much 
like the Salt Lake ordinance now challenged. 
Tentative Draft No. 13 provided: 
A person who li ters or wanders without apparent 
reason or business in a place or manner not usual 
for law-abiding individuals and under circumstances 
which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or about 
to engage in crime commits a violation if he refuses 
the request of a peace officer that he identify himself 
of Ms conduct and purpose. 
The institute adopted instead a much more tightly drawn provision 
(Model Penal Code Section 250. 6 [Proposed Official Draft, 1962]) in order 
"to save the section from possible invalidation as a subterfuge by which 
the police would be empowered to a r res t and search without probable cause. M 
(Comment p. 227, to Model Penal Code Section 250. 6 [Proposed Official 
Draft, 1962]). 
The ordinance adopted by the Institute provides: 
Model Penal Code, Section 250. 6 [Proposed Official 
Draft, 1962]: A person commits a violation if he loiters 
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or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual 
for law abiding individuals under circumstances that 
warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property 
in the vicinity. Among the circumstances which 
may be considered in determining whether such 
alarm is warranted is the fact that the actor takes 
flight upon appearance of a peace officer, refuses to 
identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal 
himself or any object. Unless flight by the actor or 
other circumstances makes it impracticable, a peace 
officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense under 
this section afford the actor the opportunity to dispel 
any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by 
requesting him to identify himself and explain his 
presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted 
of an offense under this section if the peace officer 
did not comply with the preceding sentence, or if it 
appears at trial that the explanation given by the actor 
was true and, if believed by the peace officer at the 
time, would have dispelled the alarm. 
The revised ordinance adopted by the Institute has recently been 
upheld as constitutional in State vs. Ecker, 17 Cr. L. 2001, where the 
Florida Supreme Court held that the new ordinance, identical to the Model 
Penal Code Section 250. 6 above, was a constitutional replacement to the 
ordinance struck down in Papachriston, supra. 
Lacking the requirement of prabable cause to arrest, the ordinance 
enables law enforcement officials to harass so-called undesirables. 
For example, in People vs. Williams, 55 Misc. 2d 774, 776, 286 N. Y. S. 
2d 575, 577, (New York City Crim. Ct. 1967), the court commented that: 
These defendants are 41 of a group of alleged 
prostitutes who have been arrested and detained 
2500 times in New York City . . . This Court of 
-13-
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its own knowledge is aware that except for a few 
isolated instances where defendants pleaded guilty, 
the disorderly conduct cases were dismissed. In 
many instances, Tthe girls' were arrested after 
9:30 p. m. , too late to be arraigned, night courts 
had been adjourned, then kept overnight in a cell. 
In the morning they were brought to Court and 
released because offenses for which they had been 
arrested could not be proven to have been committed 
by them. 
The Fourth Amendment requires that arrests be predicated 
upon probable cause, Beck vs. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964); Henry vs. 
United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959); Palmer vs. Euclid, 402 U. S. 544 
(1971). The Salt Lake Ordinance section permits arrests and convictions 
for suspicion or for possible crime based on circumstances less compelling 
than the reasonable stop and frisk factors which are required to sustain 
a mere on-the=scene frisk. Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). 
The ordinance flies in the face of these well established authorities 
and should be found to be unconstitutional as a violation of appellants 
Fourth Amendment guarantees. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDINANCE SECTION SERVES NO STATE INTEREST 
CONSISTENT WITH THE FOURTH & FIFTH AMENDMENT.' THE 
ORDINANCE FURTHER VIOLATES THE PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
Appellant recognizes the right of a police officer to stop and 
question a person, but a person's silence cannot be used as an idependent 
source giving rise to probably cause for arrest. Davis vs. Mississippi, 
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The United States Supreme Court in Davis vs. Mississippi, 
supra, held that police have no right to compel an answer from a citizen 
stopped for questioning. This is what, in fact, the ordinance now challenged 
compels. In Davis, supra p. 726, the Court noted the violation of appellant's 
Fourth Amendment rights by dragnet procedures employed to take finger-
prints from scores of individuals. The Court stated: 
. . . But to argue that the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply to the investigatory stage is fundamentally to 
misconceive the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
Investigatory seizure would subject unlimited numbers 
of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy 
incident to involuntary detention. Nothing is more 
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to 
prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security 
of our citizenry, whether those intrusions be termed 
'arrests1 or investigatory detentions. 
I n
 Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the concept that the Fourth Amendment is not 
involved where the conduct of officers amounts to something less than 
a technical arrest or a full-blown search. Thus, under Terry, supra, 
Fourth Amendment restrictions must be followed and under Davis, supra, 
the officer cannot require an answer even in an ''investigatory detention.,T 
Section 32-1-17 (5) violates the Fifth Amendment because "it 
punishes a person who fails to identify himself . . . or give an account 
-15-
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of his . . . conduct and purposes. " Berck, supra 415. Under the 
ordinance a person is given the choice of not answering an officer's 
questions and being arrested for that silence and incriminating himself 
by tendering a statement which the officer deems not be a "reasonably 
credible account. M 
Because the ordinance allows an officer to by-pass the Fourth 
Amendment requirement of probable cause for a search or seizure 
and further requires a person to incriminate himself through silence, 
contrary to Davis, the ordinance violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 
The ordinance further violates constitutional rights guaranteed 
under the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting the free mo vement 
of citizens through the State of Utah. 
The ordinance touches upon the inalienable rights of citizens to 
do what he will and when he will, so long as his course of conduct is not 
inimical to himself or the general public of which he is a part. Thus, the 
court in Hawaii vs. Anduha, (1931, CA 9 Hawaii) 48 F. 2d 171, found 
that while it cannot be questioned that legislation against the obstruction 
of public streets and highways, whether caused by idlers or loiterers, 
is proper, a regulation as broad as the one challenged is wholly unnecessary 
for that purpose. The challenged ordinance in that case provided that any 
person who habitually loafed or loitered or remained idle on any public 
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street or highway or in any public place was guilty of a misdemeanor. 
As the facts of this case indicate, the loitering ordinance has been enforced 
in as broad a manner as the ordinance declared void in Anduha, supra. 
There is no legitimate public interest requiring an ordinance as broad as 
this one. 
The courts in State vs. Caez, 81 NJ Super 315, 195 A. 2d 496, 
and Decker vs. Fillis, supra, holding a loitering and vagrancy ordinance 
invalid for vagueness, cited with approval the decision in Hawaii vs. 
Anduha, supra, as standing for the proposition that no ordinance may 
unreasonably or unnecessarily interfere with a person's freedom, whether 
it be to move about or to stand still. 25 A. L. R. 3d 856, 846. 
The Salt Lake City Ordinance section prohibits merely standing 
about in any public or private place if the officer determines in his own 
mind that such conduct is ''suspicious,,f and the person is either unable 
to give a "reasonably credible accounttT of his conduct or fails to identify 
himself by name and address. Thus, whether a person remains for 
twenty seconds or twenty minutes in a particular spot, makes no difference 
the way the ordinance section is worded. A person may be subjected 
to an investigatory stop and questioning for totally innocent behavior 
and may suffer the indignation of arrest and incarceration by refusing 
to identify himself or give what the officer, at that time and with no guidelines 
to aid him by whi^h the conduct of the individual may be ascertained determines 
in his own mind to be a "reasonably credible account of his conduct. " Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Such an intrusion into individual liberty is certainly abhorent to the Consti -
tution and the basic principles upon which this country was founded, that 
is the freedom to do as one wishes so long as the conduct is not inimical 
to others. 
As the Court pointed out in Anduha, supra, p. 173, to loiter is 
to consume time idly or to waste time. These words have no sinister 
meaning and imply no wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of those 
engaged in the prohibited practices. It is common knowledge that the 
majority of mankind spend goodly parts of their waking hours in idling 
time away, and much of that time is spent in public as well as private 
places. The ordinance section now challenged includes "loitering11 in 
private places. Certainly an ordinance which allows this breadth of police 
action, whereby police could arrest someone for loitering around Ms own 
home if that person refused to identify himself or give a reasonably 
credible answer, is unconstitutional as a deprivation of inherent liberties 
afforded by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution. , ••' 
CONCLUSION 
The ordinance now challenged violates due process because 
it does not give a person of "reasonable intelligence" unequivocal warning 
of proscribed conduct. The ordinance now challenged does not comport 
with the due process standard set out in Papachristou, supra, Shuttlesworth, 
supra, and Berck, supra. The Berck case involved an ordinance practically 
•• a-: ~ ~*A vr^ci r l o p l n r p H n n m i i s t i t i i t i o n a l l v 
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void for vagueness. The cases cited above have held that a penal 
ordinance must contain an ascertainable standard by which illegal conduct 
and totally innocent behavior may be judged. 
Section 32-1-17 (5) contains neither an unequivocal warning 
to citizenry or conduct to be avoided nor does it contain an ascertainable 
standard by which a person's conduct may be judged. The section is 
clearly unconstitutional as a violation of due process. 
The ordinance section now challenged places unfettered discretion 
in the hands of police and prosecution. The ordinance section allows a 
peace officer to arrest an individual if he determines the person to be 
wandering or standing in any public or private place so as to arouse 
suspicion, and either fails to identify himself or cannot tender a reasonably 
credible explanation of his conduct. The Supreme Court of the United States 
in cases cited by appellant has repeatedly declared unconstitutional ordinances 
of this nature whereby the arresting officer determines what is Msuspicious" 
and what constitutes a "reasonably credible" account of a suspect's 
conduct. 
The ordinance section does not provide for government by 
clearly defined laws but rather for goverment by the moment-to-moment 
conclusions drawn by police officers with no standard by which conduct 
may be judged. The facts of this case further indicate the arbitrary and 
discriminatory fashion in which this ordinance is enforced. Because of 
its overbreadth the ordinance encourages erratic and arbitrary arrests. 
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Appellant was removed from his car, searched, and had his wig 
removed by officers even before being asked to produce identification. 
After tendering an explanation of his conduct and purposes, appellant was 
arrested for loitering. Certainly thepublic policy argument against such 
treatment by officers encouraged by the ordinance section are compelling. 
The police cannot be armed with such an ordinance which has been shown 
to be used as a harassing technique. See People vs. Williams, supra. 
Section 32-1-7 (5) violates Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees. 
The ordinance section unconstitutionally dispenses with the 
requirement that arrests be founded on probable cause and instead, allows 
arrest upon any conduct which a police officer considers suspicious coupled 
with the failure of a suspect to produce identification or give a reasonably 
credible account of his conduct and purposes. Whether an explanation is 
reasonably credible is again an individual decision by the officer with no 
standards by which the conduct may be judged. The ordinance therefore 
violates the Fourth Amendment. 
Under Davis, supra, and Drew, supra, a person cannot be subjected 
to arrest by his silence. To so subject citizens to arrest by remaining 
silent violates the Fifth Amendment as stated in Davis, supra, and Drew, 
supra. The ordinance now challenged does exactly that which is prohibited. 
The ordinance thus flies in the face of well recognized principles of law 
and should be declared unconstitutional. 
The ordinance further violates the orivileees and immunities 
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be unreasonably and unnecessarily 
restricting freedom, whether it is the freedom to move about or stand 
still. The courts in State vs. Caez, supra, and Decker vs. Fillis, supra 
have cited Hawaii vs. Anduha, supra, as standing for the proposition 
that no ordinance may unreasonably or unnecessarily interfere with a 
person's freedom. Whether a person can move about or merely stand 
still depends upon the individual officer's assessment of that person's 
conduct, an assessment for which no ascertainable standards have been 
established to aid in determining the supposedly suspicious conduct. 
The ordinance therefore restricts movement and other personal freedoms 
by its breadth. Therfore, the ordinance should be declared unconstitutionally 
void for vagueness and overbreadth. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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